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Abstract 
 
The Human Rights Act 1998 came into effect in the UK in 2000, incorporating 
specific Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, such as the freedoms 
from torture (Article 3) and slavery (Article 4), into British law. But this legislation, 
and the rights it enshrines, are under severe attack from Politicians and sections of the 
British Press. This article presents a strong defence of the statute, by reference to one 
of its notable achievements: the obligation it imposed on the UK to outlaw the holding 
of a person in slavery or servitude, or compelling them to perform compulsory labour. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The United Kingdom (UK) does not possess a written Constitution, that is, it does not 
have either a single document or collection of documents labelled ‘Constitution’. 
Assuming the UK does in fact have a Constitution,1 this is often said to be 
‘unwritten’. A typical feature of a written Constitution such as that possessed by the 
United States of America (USA) is the inclusion of a Bill of Rights. The USA’s first 
ten amendments to its Constitution are collectively referred to as the Bill of Rights. 
The UK’s Bill of Rights is the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) (thus the UK has 
sources of a Constitution if not a single written document with the title 
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‘Constitution’). It is now thirteen years since the HRA came into domestic effect in 
October 2000, enshrining specific Articles of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) into British law. 
 
The ECHR, which was first signed in Rome in 1950, was ratified by the UK in 1951. 
It was created by the Council of Europe, which was then a group of only ten European 
nations, with a view to promoting international action and collaboration to protect 
human rights. Currently there are 47 Member States of the Council of Europe, with a 
combined population exceeding 800 million, so the reach of the ECHR is significant. 
A discussion here of the ECHR rights in British law will, therefore, appeal to a much 
wider human rights audience than a UK one, especially since s.2 of the HRA obliges 
the British courts to have regard to the judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg, France, in deciding violations of the ECHR in 
domestic law.  
 
The ECHR rights incorporated into British law by virtue of the HRA include civil 
rights such as Article 2, the right to life, Article 3, the freedom from torture and 
inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment and Article 4, the freedom from 
slavery and servitude; and political rights such as Article 10, the freedom of 
expression, and Article 11, the freedom of association and assembly. But domestically 
the HRA and/or the ECHR have come in for much criticism, perhaps because the 
HRA’s method in enforcing rights in British Law and/or the rights guaranteed by the 
ECHR are insufficiently protective of state interests? That is, the ‘interpretive 
obligation’ imposed on the courts by s.3(1) of the HRA to interpret all legislation in 
line with ECHR rights is perhaps too exacting, although it is prefaced by the phrase 
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‘so far at is possible to do so’? Similarly, the discretion conferred on the courts by 
s.4(2) of the HRA to declare legislation incompatible with the ECHR is maybe too 
loosely exercised by the Judiciary, although the courts are not permitted the power to 
invalidate an offending statute, unlike, say, Constitutional Law of the USA where an 
Act of Congress is too intrusive of freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights? This 
criticism of the HRA and/or the ECHR is especially so from the British tabloid press, 
where, for example, prisoners have allegedly been granted access to hardcore 
pornography and suspects in police custody have been given fried chicken – all in the 
cause of protecting human rights.2 But it is not just the tabloid press who have 
expressed dismay with these measures: it includes Conservative members of the 
British Coalition government. For example, the Prime Minister, David Cameron, is 
not known to be a strong supporter of the HRA and/or ECHR, especially when it 
seemingly strengthens the rights of sex offenders, such as the ruling of the UK 
Supreme Court in Regina (JF (by his Litigation Friend OF)) v. Secretary of State for 
the Home Department.3 Here the court held that the lifelong requirements on all 
persons sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment or more for a sexual offence to notify 
the police when they moved house or travelled abroad, as per s.82 of the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003, was a disproportionate interference with Article 8 of the ECHR, 
the right to private and family life. In response, Cameron said: ‘My Honourable 
Friend speaks for many people in saying how completely offensive it is, once again, 
to have a ruling…that flies in the face of common sense…We will take the minimum 
possible approach to this ruling…’4 
 
(JF (by his Litigation Friend OF)) has not been the only ECHR issue which has 
incurred the wrath of the Prime Minister. What seems to have caused Cameron 
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particular ire is the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the European-wide 
court set up by the ECHR to hear alleged violations of the Convention across the 
Continent. Famously, in Hirst v. United Kingdom (No.2)5 the ECtHR ruled that 
British law, which does not permit serving prisoners the right to vote, whatever their 
period of custody, was a disproportionate infringement of Article 3 of the 1st Protocol 
of the ECHR. Cameron was reported to have said that complying with the judgment 
made him feel ‘physically ill’.6 And more recently the Prime Minister has added 
further support to the status quo: ‘No-one should be in any doubt. Prisoners are not 
getting the vote under this government.’7 
 
The Prime Minister is not the only senior Conservative member of the British 
government to express dissatisfaction with the existing processes of human rights 
protection in the UK: the Home Secretary, Theresa May, has personally called for the 
‘scrapping’ of the HRA, highlighting the difficulties in, for example, deporting terror 
suspects.8 Indeed, the Home Secretary ridiculed the HRA at the Conservative Party 
Conference in October 2011 for permitting an illegal immigrant to remain in the UK, 
because deportation would unjustifiably have prejudiced his rights to Article 8 of the 
ECHR, the right to private and family life, namely leaving his pet cat!9 (It has since 
been reported that this story was untrue.10) Furthermore, notwithstanding the 
constitutional obligation imposed on British government Ministers to uphold the 
independence of the Judiciary, as per s.3(1) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, 
the Home Secretary, continued the fight against the human rights of some illegal 
immigrants in a seemingly personal attack on the courts in a recent newspaper article, 
titled: ‘It’s my job to deport foreigners who commit serious crime – and I’ll fight any 
judge who stands in my way, says Home Secretary.’11 Here Theresa May claimed that 
 6 
the British courts had ignored new immigration rules approved by Parliament.12 
 
The apparent contempt shown by senior Conservative members of the government 
towards the HRA and what it stands for – it seemingly confers rights and privileges 
on society’s ‘undeserving’: paedophiles, rapists and other sex offenders, terrorists, as 
well as illegal immigrants – seemingly deflects attention from the Coalition’s decision 
to set up a Commission for a Bill of Rights for the UK in March 2011. The aim of the 
Commission was to investigate the creation of a British Bill of Rights, incorporating 
and building on the existing rights and obligations currently provided for by the 
ECHR.13 The Commission published two consultation documents: Do We Need a UK 
Bill of Rights?14 in August 2011 and A Second Consultation15 in July 2012. But the 
issue of a British Bill of Rights, building on the existing rights and duties in the 
ECHR, was not new. For example, the previous Labour Government, who were the 
administration responsible for originally enacting the HRA, did explore such an idea 
in a Green Paper in 2007,16 which was tacitly approved by the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) in 2008.17 Nevertheless, the premise of the 
Conservative partner in the UK Coalition government to set up the Commission for a 
Bill of Rights was not because they shared the same enthusiasm about the 
HRA/ECHR as their previous Labour cousins: it was a concession given to the 
Liberal Democrats, to encourage the latter to join a coalition government with them.  
 
The Commission for a UK Bill of Rights has since published its final report in 
December 2012: A UK Bill of Rights? The Choice Before Us.18 Seven of the 
Commission’s nine members believed that, on balance, there was a strong argument 
in favour of a UK Bill of Rights on the basis that such a Bill would incorporate and 
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build on all of the UK’s obligations under the ECHR, and that it would provide no 
less protection than is contained in the current HRA. But two Commission members 
were opposed to this conclusion: Helena Kennedy and Philippe Sands. They believed 
that the majority had failed to identify or declare any shortcomings with the HRA or 
its application by the courts. They remained open to the idea of a UK Bill of Rights 
but were concerned that such a move at present might lead to Britain’s withdrawal 
from the ECHR.19 In the Commission failing to agree, the press has declared the 
Conservatives’ bid for a UK Bill of Rights ‘dead’, but still expect the Party to 
campaign on reform of the HRA and/or the ECHR at the next General Election in 
2015.20 So for the foreseeable future the existing mechanism for the enforcement of 
rights in the UK has something of a reprieve, but one must still expect reform to raise 
its head in the not too distant future. With this in mind it is very much important to 
recall the legacy of the HRA. 
 
The author has previously written about Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR, the right to 
life, and freedom from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. A particular 
feature of these rights is that they impose substantive or ‘positive’ obligations on a 
state, meaning that death or injury caused by third parties may engage the state if the 
state has forseen, or at the very least should have forseen, a serious risk of harm to a 
particular individual and has not acted reasonably in averting it.21 The same duty is 
imposed on a state by Article 4, that is, the state is obliged to prevent a person at risk 
from being enslaved. The British human rights organisation Liberty argues that in 
2008 it represented a young woman who had been held as a slave and had managed to 
escape her abusive employer, only to face a disinterested police force that refused to 
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investigate her allegations of abuse and assault. Until 2010, when s.71 of the Coroners 
and Justice Act 2009 came into effect, there was no criminal offence in English Law 
of holding someone in slavery or servitude or compelling them to perform forced or 
compulsory labour. Liberty says: ‘Thank goodness for the HRA. Following the 
[young woman’s] case, and using Article 4…Liberty and other organisations lobbied 
hard…for the creation of a new serious criminal offence of slavery or servitude...’22 
 
If the HRA had not been enacted (or at the very least the ECHR not been ratified by 
the UK in international law), permitting British people the enforcement of these 
human rights before their domestic courts, would the UK have been immune from its 
substantive duty to prevent infringements of slavery and servitude? These new 
criminal offences, if they are directly attributable to the UK honouring its 
responsibilities under Article 4, are surely indicative of the success of the HRA, and 
the ECHR rights it guarantees? For this reason the author in this two article study is 
continuing to further his research into the positive obligations imposed on a state by 
the ECHR – but from the perspective of slavery, servitude and forced labour. In this 
first article he considers the substantive duties imposed on the UK by Article 4 in 
implementing statutory measures to, say, criminalise slavery; in so doing, he intends 
to present a defence of the much criticised HRA/ECHR. 
 
In the second, later article the author intends to assess again the degree to which 
Britain is in fact complying with its substantive duties to prevent slavery, servitude 
and forced labour, but with particular reference to the UK’s non-legislative measures, 
such as the National Referral Mechanism (NRM), the identification procedure 
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established as part of the Council of Europe’s Convention on Action Against 
Trafficking in Human Beings to help identify victims of the modern day slavery 
practice of human trafficking. In 2006, when examining the then UK arrangements for 
preventing trafficking, the JCHR said that whilst many would agree that the 
Government had started taking some significant steps in preventing the crime, it 
considered that the current level of protection provided to victims as a whole was still 
‘far from adequate’.23 In the period between, for example, the JCHR report in 2006 
and the present day, what measures, other than legislative ones, have the UK 
introduced to comply with its positive obligations arising from Article 4 of the 
ECHR? Assessing whether Britain has been successful in introducing initiatives of a 
non-statutory nature, to combat slavery and forced labour, including human 
trafficking, will, therefore, be the focus of a second, later article in this study. Here, in 
this piece, there is an intention to evaluate the UK’s legislative measures. But first it is 
important to discuss the human right in question, the freedom from slavery, servitude 
and forced labour. This is the purpose of the next section. 
 
2. Slavery, servitude, forced and compulsory labour 
 
When one speaks of slavery there is an automatic impression of the slave trade – the 
triangular transatlantic route between Europe, Africa and the Americas – which was 
in operation internationally from the mid-17th Century; and finally abolished – at least 
in terms of participation by the British – in the early 19th Century. The trade was 
responsible for the enslavement of over three million West Africans in the Americas. 
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The slave ships’ infamous ‘Middle Passage’ – the central voyage across the Atlantic 
Ocean from Africa – was particularly cruel:  
 
‘Enslaved Africans were packed in unbelievably hot, cramped conditions in 
the hold of the ship. They were kept below decks; men, women and children 
separated. The men were usually kept shackled, hand-cuffed in pairs by their 
wrists and with iron leg-rings riveted around their ankles. Frequently they had 
so little space they could only lie on their sides. They could not sit or stand up: 
headroom was only 2 feet 8 inches (68 cm)…The physical conditions, fear and 
uncertainty left many totally traumatised and unable to eat…Beatings and 
brandings were common, as was the abuse of the women by the ships’ crews. 
The journeys could last up to six weeks and sometimes more…Disease and 
brutality took its toll: between one tenth and one quarter of the enslaved 
Africans died on every journey.’24 
 
The British trade in slaves was abolished by the Slave Trade Act 1807 but 
enslavement itself was not outlawed in Britain’s colonies until the Slave Trade 
Abolition Act 1833. This was nearly 200 hundred years ago. In 2005 the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) published its first global estimate of forced labour. It 
estimated that over 12 million people worldwide were in forced labour at any point in 
time in the period 1995-2004, meaning that this figure was only a minimum.25 The 
ILO has since revised this estimate for the period 2002-2011, believing the number is 
now nearly 21 million.26 Of these, 18.7 million (90%) are exploited in the private 
 11 
economy: 4.5 million for reasons of sexual exploitation and 14.2 million for reasons 
of labour exploitation, in areas such as agriculture, construction, domestic work and 
manufacturing.27 The remaining 2.2 million (10%) are in state-imposed forms of 
forced labour; for example, in prison conditions which contravene ILO standards, or 
in work imposed by the state military or by rebel armed forces.28 
 
People particularly susceptible to forced labour are often the most vulnerable in 
society. In the UK they are invariably recruited in benefit offices, soup kitchens and 
other places frequented by alcoholics, the homeless or those with little or no family 
support, and told they will be given work, clothing, a home and food.29 The labour is 
coerced because often those in these situations have an irregular immigration status, 
fearful that their ‘employers’ will inform the authorities. They could have also been 
threatened with violence against themselves and/or their family.30 Over time there 
often becomes an emotional dependency and institutionalisation.31 Typical features of 
people in circumstances of forced labour include: dirty and unsafe working 
conditions, including a lack of protective clothing; long working hours; unrealistic 
employment targets; under or non-payment; and more seriously, intimidation, threats, 
bullying, as well physical and/or sexual violence. Often forced labour includes social 
isolation and detention,32 which can be in appalling conditions such as confinement to 
small rooms such as lofts or cellars, invariably sleeping on cold, damp floors.33 The 
health and welfare of those in forced labour is likely to be poor, too, because of, for 
example, malnourishment.34 
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3. International Legal Responses to slavery, servitude and forced labour 
 
The freedom from slavery, servitude and other forms of forced labour is protected in 
several international human rights instruments; for example, Article 4 of the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) states: ‘No one shall be held in slavery or 
servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.’ This is 
similar wording to Article 8(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR). Regionally, there is the ECHR, for example; Article 4(1) of the 
ECHR prohibits slavery and servitude. This freedom is ‘absolute’, meaning there are 
no limitations (unlike, say, Article 10(1) of the ECHR, the freedom of expression, 
which can be infringed for the purposes of, say, the prevention of disorder and crime, 
assuming that the infringement is in proportion to the objective, as per Article 10(2)). 
Significantly, freedom from slavery is also ‘non-derogable’, as per Article 15(1) of 
the ECHR, meaning it can never be suspended in times of war or public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation. Article 4(2) of the ECHR also outlaws forced or 
compulsory labour. But interestingly Article 4(3) excludes: (a) any work done in the 
ordinary course of lawful detention; (b) compulsory military service; (c) any service 
done in an emergency or calamity threatening the life or well-being of the 
community; and (d) any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations. 
 
The serious nature of slavery is such that it deserves its own convention: the Slavery 
Convention, signed in 1926. According to Article 1(1), slavery is defined as: ‘…the 
status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the 
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right of ownership are exercised.’ This definition focuses on the notion of 
‘ownership’, the idea that a person can be bought and sold. (But, nowadays, the 
element of ownership, or rather ‘powers attached to the right of ownership’, no longer 
require the acquisition of a person for money or some other value.35) Like Article 4(3) 
of the ECHR, Article 5(2) of the Slavery Convention permits forced or compulsory 
labour in limited circumstances: ‘[The] labour shall invariably be of an exceptional 
character, shall always receive adequate remuneration, and shall not involve the 
removal of the labourers from their usual place of residence.’ Slavery and the slave 
trade are arguably crimes under customary international law, too, perhaps reaching 
the level of a ‘peremptory norm’ (jus cogens), meaning even those states who have 
not ratified the 1926 Convention are obliged to prosecute alleged perpetrators or at the 
very least turn them over to another state for prosecution. 
 
The Slavery Convention was supplemented in 1956: Supplementary Convention on 
the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to 
Slavery. Whereas the original 1926 Convention defined only ‘slavery’, the 
Supplementary Convention defined ‘servitude’, or in its terms ‘servile status’. A 
person in ‘servile status’, as per Article 1, includes: ‘debt bondage’ – ‘the status or 
condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of his personal services…as security for a 
debt, if the value of those services…is not applied towards the liquidation of the debt 
or the length and nature of those services are not respectively limited and defined’ – 
and ‘serfdom’ – ‘the condition or status of a tenant who is…bound to live and labour 
on land belonging to another person and to render some determinate service to such 
other person, whether for reward or not, and is not free to change his status.’ 
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There are also international conventions dedicated to the elimination of forced or 
compulsory labour such as the ILO’s Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory 
Labour (No.29), 1930. Article 2(1) defines forced or compulsory labour, which 
contains three main elements: first, some form of work or service must be provided; 
second, the work is performed under the threat of a penalty, which can be for example 
physical, psychological or financial; and third, the work is undertaken involuntarily, 
meaning that the person either became engaged in the activity against their free will 
or, once engaged, finds that they cannot leave the job. Like the ECHR there are some 
exceptions, as per Article 2(2) of this Convention. These are similar in nature to 
Article 4(3) of the ECHR. 
 
The issue of slavery and servitude was addressed by, for example, the ECtHR in 
Siliadin v. France.36 Here the court found that a 16 year old Togolese national, 
working involuntarily as an unpaid household servant lasting 15 hours a day, seven 
days a week, had not been held in slavery in the traditional sense: ‘Although the 
applicant was, in the instant case, clearly deprived of her personal autonomy, the 
evidence does not suggest that she was held in slavery in the proper sense, in other 
words that Mr and Mrs B. exercised a genuine right of legal ownership over her, thus 
reducing her to the status of an ‘object’’.37 However, the ECtHR did rule that the 
applicant had been held in servitude.38 Servitude was linked to the concept of slavery 
and was a particularly serious form of deprivation of liberty, involving an obligation 
to provide one’s services under coercion, to live on the property of another and being 
unable to change one’s situation.39  
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4. The positive nature of freedom from slavery, servitude and forced labour 
 
Very much like other fundamental rights such as the right to life and freedom from 
torture, states must not only refrain from infringing freedom from slavery, that is, the 
right acts ‘negatively’, but take measures to prevent its violation, meaning the right 
also acts ‘positively’. For example, Article 2 of the 1926 Slavery Convention obliges 
state parties: (a) to prevent and suppress the slave trade; and (b) to bring about, 
progressively and as soon as possible, the complete abolition of slavery in all its 
forms. Article 5 of the same Convention also obliges state parties to take all necessary 
measures to prevent compulsory or forced labour from developing into conditions 
analogous to slavery. Using similar language to Article 5, Article 1 of the 1956 
Supplementary Convention obliges all state parties to take all practicable and 
necessary legislative and other measures to bring about progressively and as soon as 
possible the complete abolition or abandonment of servitude. Similarly, the ILO is 
responsible for conventions whose purpose is to impose positive duties on states to 
prevent forced and compulsory labour, such as: Convention Concerning Forced or 
Compulsory Labour (No.29), 1930 and Convention Concerning the Abolition of 
Forced Labour (No.105), 1957. In reference to the former, Article 1 says that each 
member state undertakes to suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in all its 
forms within the shortest possible period. One way of fulfilling a state’s 
responsibilities to eradicate slavery, servitude etc is to criminalise the practice. For 
example, Article 6(1) of the 1956 Supplementary Slavery Convention states: ‘The act 
of enslaving another person…or of attempting these acts, or being accessory thereto, 
or being a party to a conspiracy to accomplish any such acts, shall be a criminal 
offence under the laws of the States Parties to this Convention…’ 
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Regionally, the ECtHR has discussed the positive duties imposed on states to prevent 
violations of fundamental rights of the ECHR on several occasions. Of particular note 
is Article 2(1) of the ECHR, which is explicit in the substantive obligation it imposes 
on states to protect life: ‘Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law.’ This duty 
was considered by the ECtHR at length in the case of Osman v. United Kingdom.40 
There the court said: 
 
‘The Court notes that the first sentence of Article 2(1) enjoins the State not 
only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take 
appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction. It is 
common ground that the State’s obligation…extends beyond its primary duty 
to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal law provisions 
to deter the commission of offences against the person backed up by law-
enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and sanctioning of 
breaches of such provisions.’41 
 
Nevertheless, this positive obligation imposed on a state to prevent violations of the 
right to life by third parties is not limitless:  
  
‘For the Court, and bearing in mind the difficulties involved in policing 
modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational 
choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources, such an 
obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible 
or disproportionate burden on the authorities. Accordingly, not every claimed 
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risk to life can entail for the authorities a Convention requirement to take 
operational measures to prevent that risk from materialising.’42 
 
For the court to find a breach of a state’s positive duty to protect life it must be 
established that ‘the authorities knew or ought to have known…of the existence of a 
real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the 
criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of 
their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that 
risk.’43 That is, it is sufficient for an applicant to show that the authorities did not do 
all that could have been reasonably expected of them, to avoid a real and immediate 
risk to life of which they had, or ought to have had, knowledge.44 
 
These principles of ECHR law apply equally to other fundamental human rights such 
as freedom from slavery. This was confirmed by the ECtHR in Siliadin.45 Indeed, an 
effective deterrent could only have been achieved by criminal-law provisions, the 
court in Siliadin stated.46 In respect of the specific facts of that case the court observed 
that the applicant’s ‘employers’ were prosecuted under the then Articles 225-13 and 
225-14 of the French Criminal Code, which had made it an offence to exploit an 
individual’s labour and to submit him or her to working or living conditions that were 
incompatible with human dignity.47 The defendants were then sentenced to twelve 
months’ imprisonment, seven of which were suspended, and ordered to pay a fine of 
FRF 100,000 each and to pay, jointly and severally, FRF 100,000 to the applicant in 
damages.48 But these offences, and subsequent punishments, were insufficiently 
robust to protect the applicant from abuse.49 Following the ruling of the ECtHR in 
Siliadin it was noted: ‘[Countries] will be expected, in order to fulfil their positive 
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obligations under Article 4, to establish adequate and clear criminal offences in 
relation to forced labour practices…and to impose appropriate sentences.’50 
 
One of those countries where it was argued that the law did not adequately protect 
people was the UK: ‘The judgment [in Siliadon] suggests that the UK is now in 
breach of its obligations under Article 4, since…neither slavery, nor servitude or 
forced or compulsory labour are currently criminal offences.’51 This suspicion was 
later confirmed in the case of CN v. United Kingdom,52 where the ECtHR ruled that 
the legislative framework in place, prior to the enactment of offences contrary to s.71 
of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (see more below), had been insufficient to 
afford practical and effective protection against the violations of Article 4 by third 
parties.53 The court also found that there had been an inadequate investigation by the 
British authorities, such as the London Police’s Human Trafficking Team, of a 
credible complaint of domestic servitude by the applicant, who had fled Uganda to 
escape sexual and physical violence and been forced to work as a live-in carer for an 
elderly couple.54 This case therefore also confirmed that there was a corresponding 
procedural duty imposed on a state, arising from its positive obligation, to investigate 
suspected violations of Article 4, a process that was well established in the 
jurisprudence of other fundamental rights of the ECHR, such as Article 2, the right to 
life.55 
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5. Human Trafficking 
 
A contemporary form of slavery is human trafficking. This is thought to be the 
world’s fastest growing criminal activity involving a global enterprise worth in the 
region of US $32 billion, of which 2.4 million people are thought to be its victims.56 
Human trafficking involves the movement of a person from one place to another into 
conditions of exploitation, using, for example, deception.57 According to Article 3(a) 
of the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially W omen and Children, that is, the ‘Palermo Protocol’, human 
trafficking is defined as: ‘The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or 
receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, 
of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability…for the purpose of exploitation.’ (Exploitation includes sexual 
exploitation, forced labour, slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.) Human 
trafficking has therefore three constituent elements: a movement; a control; and a 
purpose – the exploitation of a person.58 Although human trafficking often involves 
an international cross-border element, it is possible to be a victim of human 
trafficking within one’s own country.59 
 
Trafficking is to be contrasted with ‘human smuggling’. The latter involves, 
according to Article 3 of the United Nations Protocol Against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, the ‘procurement, in order to obtain, directly or 
indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a 
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State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident’. So human 
smuggling involves the transportation of willing migrants in search of, maybe, better 
economic opportunities, whilst trafficking has a more sinister and exploitative 
purpose; a trafficked person’s initial consent to be moved has been vitiated by fraud, 
for example. Thus, whilst both practices are illicit – assisting a person’s unlawful 
immigration into a Member State of the European Union (EU), such as the UK, is an 
offence contrary to s.25 of the Immigration Act 1971, for example – there is a key 
difference, principally arising from a smuggled person’s full and informed consent to 
be transported. (Importantly, however, a person could start out as being smuggled, 
only to become trafficked if their circumstances tragically change. So the two 
practices can be very similar in nature.60) 
 
In the case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia,61 where the victim had been trafficked 
from Russia to Cyprus for reasons of sexual exploitation, the ECtHR likened 
trafficking to slavery; the ECHR was a living instrument to be interpreted in modern 
day conditions.62 The court noted that, like slavery, trafficking in human beings, by its 
very nature and aim of exploitation, was based on the exercise of powers attaching to 
the right of ownership; it treated human beings as commodities to be bought and sold 
and put to forced labour, often for little or no money; it implied close surveillance of 
the activities of victims, whose movements were often circumscribed; and it involved 
the use of violence and threats against victims, who lived and worked under poor 
conditions.63  
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Very much like other forms of slavery and forced labour, the ‘Palermo Protocol’ 
emphasises a substantive obligation on states to take positive measures to avert human 
trafficking. For example, Article 2 states that the purpose of the Protocol is – (a) to 
prevent and combat trafficking in persons; (b) to protect and assist the victims of such 
trafficking, with full respect for their human rights; and (c) to promote cooperation 
among States Parties to meet those objectives. One way of preventing trafficking is to 
introduce domestic measures outlawing the practice. In this respect, Article 5 obliges 
state parties to criminalise trafficking. Moreover, Article 6, which is described as 
‘assistance to and protection of victims of trafficking’, notes that a trafficked person is 
a victim rather than an accessory to the trafficking. And Article 7 encourages states to 
allow victims of trafficking to remain in their country of transit if they so wish.  
 
In addition to international documents outlawing human trafficking, there are regional 
human rights documents preventing the practice, too, such as the Council of Europe’s 
Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. Article 4 adopts the same 
definition of human trafficking as that contained in Article 3 of the Palermo Protocol, 
and Article 1 of the Convention has similar purposes to Article 2 of the Palermo 
Protocol. There are further provisions in the Convention emphasising the positive 
nature of the right, such as Article 5(2) which obliges state parties to establish and/or 
strengthen effective policies and programmes to prevent trafficking, as well as 
Articles 10 and 12 addressing victim protection. Much like Article 6 of the Palermo 
Protocol, Article 18 of the Convention imposes obligations on state parties to 
criminalise trafficking. Regionally, there is also an EU Directive on Trafficking: 
Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings and Protecting its Victims.64 
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In the case of Rantsev,65 which was referred to above, the ECtHR discussed states’ 
substantive duties to prevent trafficking. To fulfil the positive nature of their 
obligations, states must: (1) adopt criminal law measures to punish traffickers; (2) put 
in place appropriate legal and administrative frameworks to prevent people becoming 
victims of trafficking; (3) take protective operational measures when it is 
demonstrated that the State authorities were aware, or ought to have been aware, of 
circumstances giving rise to a credible suspicion that an identified individual has 
been, or was at real and immediate risk of being, trafficked or exploited; (4) 
investigate situations of trafficking; and (5) cooperate in cross-border trafficking 
cases.66  
 
In specific reference to the ‘operational duty’ element of Article 4 (see point 3 above 
in Rantsev), that is, authorities were aware, or ought to have been aware, of 
circumstances giving rise to a credible suspicion that an identified individual has 
been, or was at real and immediate risk of being, trafficked or exploited, this is of 
course an elucidation of the test developed by the ECtHR in the Article 2 case of 
Osman (see above), or was it? Following Osman, this ‘operational duty’ test has two 
criteria: (1) a ‘knowledge’ element (point 3 above) and (2) a ‘due diligence’ element, 
which demands doing what reasonably could have been expected to avoid the 
foreseeable risk.67 Stoyanova argues that the original test established in Osman was 
modified in Rantsev (making the test less demanding?), that is, a new ‘knowledge’ 
element was added: ‘a credible suspicion’ that an identified individual was trafficked. 
So, it is not necessarily required now that the authorities knew, or ought to have 
known, of the existence of a real and immediate risk – only perhaps in circumstances 
where there was a risk of being trafficked (rather than a situation where a person was 
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suspected of having been trafficked). Stoyanova states that the Court did not explain 
where the standard of ‘credible suspicion’ came from; neither did it give any hints as 
to why exactly this standard was endorsed.68 
 
In applying these five principles of law to the facts of the case, the ECtHR in Rantsev 
found that Cyprus and Russia had failed in their duties to prevent violations of Article 
4. The court concluded that Cyprus had violated its positive obligations on two 
counts: first, the failure of the Cypriot police to take operational measures to protect 
the victim, Ms Rantseva, since circumstances had given rise to a credible suspicion 
that she had been a victim of trafficking;69 secondly, and more broadly, Cyprus’ 
failure to put in place an appropriate legal and administrative framework to combat 
trafficking generally as a result of the then regime of ‘artiste visas’.70 That is, the 
Cypriot authorities must have been aware of the problem of trafficking for sexual 
exploitation in their country, and when the victim was brought to their attention they 
should have recognised a risk and taken steps to protect her.71 Does this widen the 
state’s positive duty again, in that fulfilling the ‘knowledge element’ of the 
‘operational duty’ test, states must also have regard to circumstances in their 
respective countries which are particularly susceptible to human rights abuses, like the 
Cypriot artiste visa? 
 
‘Article 4 obliges states to prosecute and penalise effectively anyone who has 
engaged in acts aimed at holding another in slavery, servitude or forced 
labour. In Rantsev the court went further…The obligation is no longer 
confined to the criminal law, as required by Siliadin. It addresses victims and 
potential victims…States cannot turn a blind eye to businesses that act as 
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fronts for trafficking; furthermore, they must look at their own immigration 
rules to see whether they are in line with the protective function of Article 4 – 
for instance, in the Rantsev case, one problem was that the Cypriot visa regime 
in force at the time made it relatively easy for the employer to control and 
exploit the foreign worker.’72 
 
Moreover, in Rantsev Russia was in breach of Article 4 on account of its failure to 
investigate how and where the victim had been recruited and, in particular, to take 
steps to identify those involved in her recruitment or the methods of recruitment 
used.73 Rantsev was undoubtedly, therefore, a significant case in terms of Article 4. 
Not only was Cyprus liable for failing to prevent violations of this human right, it 
being the destination state, but Russia was culpable, too, to some degree, as the source 
state. Thus, this case emphasised the transnational nature of human trafficking and the 
obligations imposed on states by international human rights law to cooperative 
effectively in its prevention. 
 
6. UK Laws outlawing Slavery and Forced Labour, including Trafficking 
 
Britain has a range of statutes outlawing slavery, servitude and forced labour, 
including human trafficking. Participating in the slave trade, that is, dealing in slaves, 
or exporting or importing slaves, is an offence under s.10 of the Slave Trade Act 
1824. More recently, the Sexual Offences Act 2003 criminalises trafficking into the 
UK, within the UK, and out of the UK for the purposes of sexual exploitation: ss.57-
59 respectively. These offences, which came into force in the UK in May 2004, attract 
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a maximum sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment. And, assuming a person arranges or 
facilitates the arrival into the UK of an individual, the Asylum and Immigration 
(Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 criminalises trafficking into the UK, within 
the UK, and out of the UK – ss.4(1), 4(2) and 4(3) respectively – for reasons other 
than sexual abuse such as exploitation for labour, organ removal or benefit fraud. 
These offences, which came into force in the UK in December 2004, also attract a 
maximum sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment. 
 
A further offence which criminalises holding another person in slavery or servitude or 
requiring them to perform forced or compulsory labour was introduced by the 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s.71(1). This and came into force in the UK in April 
2010 and carries a maximum sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment. It was introduced 
after intense lobbying by human rights groups such as Liberty and Anti-Slavery 
International. Campaigners argued that too many loopholes existed in British law 
before 2009 because of the need to prove a person had also been trafficked, for 
example. The campaign to introduce this offence also intensified after 23 Chinese 
cockle pickers drowned in Morecambe Bay, Lancashire, in 2004.74 The latter incident 
was also significant in producing legislation of its own: the Gangmasters (Licensing) 
Act 2004. Section 1 of the Act established the Gangmasters Licensing Authority, 
which, according to s.3, is responsible for setting up and operating a licensing scheme 
for those providing employment in agriculture, shellfish gathering and the processing 
and packaging sectors.75 Sections 6 and 12 prohibit anyone from acting as a 
gangmaster without a licence.76 
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7. Assessing UK Law’s Compliance with the Positive Duty of Article 4 
 
The HRA came into effect in October 2000, enshrining Article 4 of the ECHR, the 
prohibition on slavery, servitude and forced labour, into UK law. This not the only 
success of the HRA. Of course this statute has many achievements but word 
limitations, alas, do not permit the author to discuss all of these here, so the reader 
may wish to see, for example: Liberty, The Human Rights Act: What’s Not to Love?77 
Nevertheless, what is particularly important about the HRA are the fundamental rights 
of the ECHR – the right to life, freedom from torture and freedom from slavery – it 
incorporates into domestic law. Yes, their very significance as basic human rights is 
important, but what also makes them particularly special is their positive nature, that 
is, the substantive duties they impose on states to prevent violations, especially by 
third parties. Without the HRA, and the ECHR rights it enshrines, coupled with the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR such as Siliadin, the UK probably would not have had an 
offence of holding a person in slavery or servitude or requiring them to perform 
forced or compulsory labour. It will be recalled that in the case of CN78 the ECtHR 
ruled that Britain’s legislative framework in place prior to s.71 of the Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009 was insufficiently robust to afford practical and effective protection 
against violations of Article 4. In argument, the UK Government had claimed that the 
then criminal offences were adequate. Nevertheless, the ECtHR ruled that someone 
like CN, who had been subjected to domestic servitude, but was not a victim of 
trafficking, was left without any assistance or remedy.79 Thus, if this situation had 
continued, there would not have been the successful convictions of various members 
of the Connors family – Tommy Snr, James John, Patrick and Josie Connors –at 
Luton Crown Court in July 2012. 
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The Connors controlled, exploited, verbally abused and beat their victims at a caravan 
site near Leighton Buzzard in Bedfordshire. They coerced their victims into working 
for their block paving business. The victims were given little food, forced to wash in 
cold water and paid little or no money for working up to 19 hours a day, six days a 
week. They lived in caravans and sheds deemed unfit for human habitation and spent 
Sundays doing further work by way of door-to-door selling.80 James John and Josie 
Connors were sentenced to 11 and four years respectively.81 At a separate trial in May 
2013, the jury failed to reach verdicts on other charges against Tommy Snr and 
Patrick Connors. Tommy Snr and Patrick were then sentenced to eight and five years 
respectively for their convictions, with James John and Josie Connors, from the 
previous year.82 Surely the successful convictions of the Connors family under s.71 of 
the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, arguably because of the UK’s obligations to take 
effective measures preventing violations of Article 4 of the ECHR, is a strong defence 
of the HRA? 
 
But this legislation is not without criticism; there is a particular difficulty in 
establishing the existence of coercion, for example. In this respect, Mantouvalou 
argues: 
 
‘Modern slaves are not held in chains – not literally. Are they actually free to 
work in extremely poor conditions if their only alternative is extreme socio-
economic deprivation or deportation? Because of the lack of explicit physical 
force, it might be argued that there is nothing coerced in these situations…if 
they are not locked up in the employer’s home or business premises.’83 
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This is a view shared by the UK’s Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) 
in its 2012 British Human Rights Review.84 Whilst the EHRC largely believed that the 
current domestic legislative framework to criminalise forced labour had complied 
with the relevant human rights obligations to prohibit the practice,85 it argued that 
prosecuting cases was challenging. It could be very difficult to distinguish between 
bad conditions at work and a situation which actually had constituted forced labour. 
Therefore, when agencies came across bad conditions they were unsure whether the 
situation should be dealt with in an employment tribunal or by a criminal prosecution. 
In the EHRC’s opinion, the Coroners and Justice Act has not helped to clarify this 
distinction: ‘All [the statute] says is that it is an offence to ‘require another person to 
perform forced or compulsory labour’ – it does not define these terms. There is, 
therefore, a risk that the Act will not deter perpetrators or lead to effective 
prosecutions.’86 
 
The EHRC further noted: by the end of 2010, there had only been 107 convictions for 
trafficking under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and 22 convictions for trafficking 
under the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004.87 (In 2011 the 
convictions rates for these two offences were 8 and 0 respectively.88) The EHRC 
argued that the ‘new’ offences would not sufficiently deter offenders for this reason 
either.89 A view recently shared by a specialist in this area: ‘The risks for criminals 
are still too low and the benefits for them in terms of money are still high. That 
balance needs to be addressed.’90 Why might organised criminals make a conscious 
decision to, say, traffic humans rather than, say, drugs or weapons? One argument 
may be the sentencing regimes in Britain for these offences.91 The minimum and 
maximum sentences for human trafficking are 12 months and 14 years respectively, 
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whereas the minimum and maximum sentences for drug trafficking are 2 years and 
life respectively; and the minimum and maximum sentences for arms trafficking are 5 
years and life respectively. The low risks for criminals involved in human trafficking 
can then have demotivating effects on the investigating authorities. One example is 
‘Operation Ruby’ which focused on a leek farm in Northamptonshire in 2008. Some 
200 police officers targeted 21 premises, arresting 13 people, who were later 
charged.92 The authorities spent three years building a case – and yet there were no 
convictions:  
 
‘It was a signal, heard by every police force in the country, that going after a 
suspected immigrant ring is one of the most expensive and potentially fruitless 
exercises in modern policing. Some of the officers later [said]…that the cost 
of the operation “crippled the entire unit”. They might have secured 
convictions, they said, “if the legislation was there”. But it isn’t, not properly. 
The Connors convictions were under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009...But 
this is only one of the three types of offence under which a case may fall: 
sometimes, it is treated as an immigration issue; sometimes, as a sex crime. 
The police complain that they are not sure what type of conviction they are 
looking for, or what evidence they need for it. Indeed, many trafficked women 
still face being arrested themselves, rather than being treated as victims.’93 
 
Britain’s legislative responses to slavery, servitude and forced labour, including 
human trafficking, could be improved, there is no doubt; one way of doing so is 
maybe to address the sentencing regime. Is this sufficiently preventative to discharge 
the UK’s substantive obligation under Article 4 of the ECHR, especially when 
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compared to, say, the minimum and maximum sentences for trafficking in drugs and 
arms? Perhaps the sentencing regime for human trafficking is not the problem, but the 
actual sentences being imposed on those found guilty is? In fact, the average sentence 
for human trafficking in the UK is 4.7 years.94 A typical case is this: 
 
‘A former hospital director has been ordered to pay £25,000 to an African 
woman she kept as a slave in London. Mwanahamisi Mruke was flown from 
Tanzania in 2006 and made to work 18-hour days for Saeeda Khan at her 
home in London. The judge at Southwark Crown Court, who also gave her a 
suspended nine-month prison term, said she was guilty of “the most appalling 
greed”…“I felt like a fool, I was treated like a slave,” Ms Mruke said. The 
court heard how Khan fed Mruke two slices of bread a day and ordered her 
around by ringing a bell she kept in her bedroom. Ms Mruke was banned from 
leaving the house and never learned English because the family watched 
Pakistani TV. Beginning work at 6am, she would often not be allowed to rest 
before midnight as she cleaned, gardened, cooked meals and accompanied 
Khan’s disabled son on walks.’95 
 
Was a fine of £25,000 and a suspended nine-month prison term sufficiently serious to 
reflect the degree of abuse by the defendant against the victim, especially since the 
judge actually trying the case described the defendant as being guilty of the ‘most 
appalling greed’? Indeed, was this sufficiently punitive to act as a deterrent against 
others involved in similar criminal acts?  
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Another outcome from ‘Operation Ruby’ was the apparent confusion shown by the 
investigating authorities in dealing with the case, that is, was it a criminal matter or an 
immigration one? The British human rights organisation, the Centre for Social Justice 
(CSJ), believes the UK needs a modern Slavery Act.96 It states that legislation relating 
to human trafficking and modern slavery currently lies under three different Acts: the 
Sexual Offences Act 2003, the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) 
Act 2004 and the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.97 Then, confusion caused by this 
separation is compounded by the fact that offences of human trafficking for non-
sexual exploitation fall under immigration law:98 ‘This separation is unhelpful, and 
creates unnecessary confusion for those whose job it is to implement the legislation. It 
also perpetuates the misunderstanding of modern slavery as primarily an immigration 
– not a criminal – problem. This holds our country back.’99 Part of the problem, the 
CSJ argues, is that the responsibility in government for this area lies with Britain’s 
Minister for Immigration. Modern slavery is a crime and not an immigration issue, so 
the remit should be transferred to the Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice.100 
 
It must be recalled, however, that without the HRA, and the ECHR rights it enshrines 
in domestic law, the Connors family probably would have been immune from 
prosecution because of the lack of movement of their workers (notwithstanding 
possible alternative charges for violence, in that they assaulted some of their victims). 
In sentencing two of the defendants, James John Connors and Josie Connors, the 
judge, HHJ Michael Kay QC, said:  
 
‘The homeless, addicted and isolated men who sleep rough and beg on the 
streets were potential workers who could be exploited for financial gain…The 
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promise of pay in return for work was a monstrous and callous deceit...to 
entice the men to enter the travellers’ site, at which point more insidious 
methods of control and manipulation could be utilised to keep them in 
servitude and exact forced labour. Primarily the methods used…were brutality 
and intimidation. Assaults by way of punches, kicks, slaps or beatings with a 
weapon were committed to mark disapproval of insubordination or what was 
deemed to be an unacceptable standard or speed of work or to emphasise the 
hierarchy of control...Threats were made of grave and even life threatening 
consequences if a worker sought to leave. As well as using physical means to 
keep workers in servitude, the defendants also acted towards them so as to 
apply and maintain psychological pressure. In order to increase their sense of 
isolation, to strip them of their identity and degrade them, a number of 
measures were employed. There was verbal abuse on a regular basis. They 
were sworn at and called names which demeaned them. There were not 
permitted to have any money. Identity or private documents were removed and 
destroyed. They were housed in accommodation which was markedly inferior 
to that enjoyed by the defendants and at times was unsuitable for human 
habitation…Clothes were confiscated and thrown away. In some cases…their 
heads were shaved...The [Connors] complete disdain for the dignity and 
fundamental rights of their fellow human beings is shocking.’101 
 
In its 2011 Human Trafficking Strategy, the British Government undertook to review 
its trafficking legislation to ensure the effective deterrence, disruption and prosecution 
of offenders.102 An internal review was conducted some months later. This review 
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was published in 2011 and identified three areas where the UK’s legislation could be 
strengthened. At the time new laws were already being introduced in two of these 
areas: to criminalise human trafficking committed by British nationals anywhere in 
the world; and to criminalise human trafficking for purposes of non-sexual 
exploitation which had taken place wholly within the UK.103 (These were to comply 
with the UK’s obligations in Article 10(1) of the EU Directive on Trafficking.) 
Sections 109 and 110 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 have since outlawed 
these two situations. The former – a UK national committing human trafficking 
abroad for reasons of sexual exploitation – contains extremely broad provisions and 
has a wide extra-territorial reach.104 The latter – a UK national committing human 
trafficking abroad, and within the UK for reasons of non-sexual exploitation – goes 
further than, say, s.4 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) 
Act 2004, in that there a person must first arrange or facilitate a person’s entry into 
Britain. The third area identified by the UK’s legislative review related to unduly 
lenient sentences. At present only offences of trafficking for sexual exploitation, as 
per s.36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, can be referred by Britain’s Attorney 
General to the Court of Appeal for consideration, where it appears to him or her that a 
court of first instance has passed an unduly lenient sentence. The Government stated 
that it would correct this anomaly.105 
 
Earlier the UK’s minimum and maximum sentences for human trafficking were 
questioned. However, the maximum sentence for human trafficking, which is 14 
years, compares favourably with, say, the EU Directive on Trafficking which sets 10 
years’ imprisonment, as per Article 4(2), as a minimum maximum sentence. Indeed 
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the maximum sentences in comparable countries – Germany and Sweden, for example 
– are less than the UK’s: 10 years.  
 
In concluding its statutory review of trafficking legislation, the UK Government did 
not believe that wholesale change to legislation was required. Whilst introducing a 
new human trafficking bill to consolidate existing legislation into one Act would have 
been administratively neater (perhaps along the lines of the CSJ’s call for a modern 
Slavery Act?) the report did not find this was necessary:106 ‘To rely solely on 
prosecuting and convicting the perpetrators means that we have failed to tackle the 
core issue, protecting the vulnerable people who are susceptible to traffickers in the 
first place.’107 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
As far back as 2006 the JCHR broadly agreed that the then legislative framework to 
prohibit and criminalise human trafficking in the UK had complied with relevant 
human rights obligations.108 But what of situations where a person had allegedly been 
enslaved but there was no, or little evidence, that they had been trafficked? In Siliadin 
the ECtHR held that France had been in violation of its positive duty to prevent 
violations of Article 4 of the ECHR, by insufficiently deterring the domestic abuse of 
a young girl from Togo. Later, therefore, the UK enacted s.71 of the Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009 criminalising holding a person in slavery and servitude or 
compelling a person to perform forced or compulsory labour, thus making it ECHR 
compliant (as confirmed by the subsequent case of CN at the ECtHR). This new 
offence is surely a success of the HRA, and the ECHR rights it introduces into British 
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law, especially those of a fundamental nature such as Article 4 where there is a further 
duty imposed on a state to prevent their abuse by non-state actors. (And let us not 
forget the corresponding procedural obligation to investigate their alleged violations.) 
Without the ECHR, and the legislation permitting enforcement of this Convention in 
the UK, holding a person either in slavery or servitude, may never have been a crime. 
Should not Britain, therefore, rejoice in its existing domestic protection of human 
rights? Of course there are those who seek to repeal the HRA and/or withdraw from 
the ECHR. In the introduction to this work the British Prime Minister, David 
Cameron, and the Home Secretary, Theresa May, were identified as being some of the 
chief ‘culprits’. Indeed, only yesterday (at the time of writing) the Home Secretary did 
not miss the opportunity to have another ‘dig’ at the HRA, in issuing a statement on 
the eventual deportation of the suspected terrorist, Abu Qatada, from the UK to 
Jordan. (Previous attempts to deport Qatada had been prevented by the UK courts and 
the ECtHR because of real fears that either he would be tortured upon his return, or, at 
the very least, evidence used against him at any subsequent criminal trial would have 
been extracted through the torture of other suspects – see, for example: Othman (Abu 
Qatada) v. United Kingdom 109).):  
 
‘[Abu Qatada’s] departure marks the conclusion of efforts to remove him 
since 2001 and I believe this will be welcomed by the British public. I am glad 
that this government’s determination to see him on a plane has been vindicated 
and that we have at last achieved what previous governments, Parliament and 
the British public have long called for. This dangerous man has now been 
removed from our shores to face the courts in his own country. I am also clear 
that we need to make sense of our human rights laws [my italics]…’110  
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Theresa May was later quoted as saying that the option of Britain withdrawing from 
the ECHR should ‘remain on the table’.111 Indeed, this view was supposedly shared 
by the Secretary of State for Justice, Chris Grayling, who has Ministerial 
responsibility for human rights issues. When also speaking about the deportation of 
Abu Qatata to Jordan, Grayling suggested that the Conservative party would advocate 
wholesale withdrawal from the ECHR.112 These are chilling reminders of the 
Conservative Party’s apparent determination to repeal the UK’s existing human rights 
protection after the next General Election, if it wins a majority of seats in the House 
of Commons.  
 
The overall purpose of this article has been to present a defence of the HRA, but, 
because of restrictions on word limit, doing so has been restricted to one of the rights 
of the ECHR, Article 4, the freedom from slavery, servitude and forced labour. A 
particular feature of this human right, like others of a fundamental nature such as 
Article 2, the right to life, and Article 3, freedom from torture, is its positive or 
substantive nature, that is, its obligation imposed on states to prevent their violation, 
especially those by third parties. The conclusion here is that the HRA has been a 
success, at least in terms of Article 4 and the duty it has imposed on the UK to 
implement legislative measures preventing its abuse. Yes, there was maybe a hole in 
terms of statutory provision outlawing, say, the criminalisation of trafficking by 
British nationals abroad, and the trafficking of persons for reasons of non-sexual 
exploitation within the UK, but the government has now taken steps to address these 
in ss.109-110 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. Of course governmental 
powers to appeal an unduly lenient sentence for all instances of human trafficking 
remain. And there is perhaps an argument for a modern Slavery Act consolidating the 
 37 
existing statutes dealing with this area, but whilst this would be administratively 
neater, as the government recognises, is this really a priority in practice? 
 
What remains to be addressed, however, are other obligations imposed on a state by 
Article 4. This article has analysed the UK’s duties to prevent violations of this right 
by reference to statutory measures. What about this country’s non-statutory measures 
such as the better treatment of victims of human trafficking who are often prosecuted 
and/or deported? There is a high chance that people who have been returned to their 
country of origin will be retrafficked, the consequence of which: ‘They have been 
doubly victimised: first by those who trafficked them and then by those who had the 
responsibility to protect them.’113 There maybe comes a point, therefore, where more 
laws in this area are not the answer? Those investigating authorities on the ground, the 
British police, the UK Border Agency etc perhaps need to treat those that have been 
trafficked more as victims rather than as criminals – otherwise the UK will, arguably, 
continue to violate its substantive obligation to prevent abuses of Article 4, 
notwithstanding the fact that it has taken the step of implementing a robust criminal 
law response? An approach to this area should, therefore, involve more than the 
criminalisation of trafficking: it must be more human rights based.114 That is, most 
victims of trafficking are poor and uneducated economic migrants, so this area is 
possibly more of an issue of education and international development aid than 
criminality.115 And potential victims must sometimes ‘go under the radar’ to avoid 
strict laws on the employment of non-nationals, such as Britain’s Immigration, 
Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 which imposes heavy penalties on employers who 
employ someone who is not from the EU, for example. In this respect, therefore, 
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perhaps a degree of legalisation of the entry of unskilled work is required, as there is a 
demand for this type of labour across many countries in the EU?116 
 
In 2006, whilst broadly accepting the UK’s legislative measures in response to human 
trafficking, the JCHR did say that the current level of protection for victims as a 
whole was ‘still far from adequate’.117 Indeed, the Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group 
(ATMG), a coalition of individuals, organisations and agencies across the UK, which 
was set up in 2009 to monitor the UK’s implementation of the Council of Europe’s 
Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, published a damning 
report of the UK’s treatment of victims four years after the 2006 JCHR report: Wrong 
Kind of Victim? One Year on: an Analysis of UK Measures to Protect Trafficked 
Persons. It argued that Britain had failed in its practical compliance of the 
Convention;118 significantly, the report castigated the National Referral Mechanism 
(NRM), the identification procedure established as part of the Convention to help 
identify the victims of trafficking, saying the system was ‘not fit for purpose’.119 In 
June 2012, the UK’s ATMG launched its second report into Britain’s compliance of 
the Council of Europe Convention: All Change: Preventing Trafficking in the UK.120 
Echoing previous concerns expressed in this article, the report highlighted, for 
example, the undue emphasis that British anti-trafficking policy had placed on law 
enforcement and immigration control.121 Indeed, the UK’s ATMG has only just 
launched its third report, In the Dock: Examining the UK’s Criminal Justice Response 
to Trafficking. In it, the UK Government is warned that it risks ‘losing the fight’ 
against human trafficking unless, for example, the criminal justice system urgently 
improves its response to the crime. The ATMG found widespread evidence that many 
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trafficked people were being prosecuted, while the criminal bosses who had enslaved 
them were going unpunished.122 
 
Analysing Britain’s non-statutory measures averting infringements of slavery, 
servitude and forced labour, including human trafficking, especially in the light of the 
UK’s ATMG three reports into the UK’s compliance with the Council of Europe’s 
Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, will therefore be the 
focus of the next article in this study. Nonetheless, even before the completion of this 
next piece, it is perhaps inevitable from the conclusion here that much of this second 
article will concentrate on the UK’s apparent reliance still to prosecute and (if a non-
EU national) deport a victim of trafficking. This is despite the fact that, for example, 
Article 6 of the Palermo Protocol, which Britain ratified at least seven years ago, in 
2006, obliges states to provide assistance to and protection of victims of trafficking, 
emphasising the point that a trafficked person is a victim rather than an accessory to 
the trafficking. And Article 7 encourages states to allow victims of trafficking to 
remain in their country of transit if they so wish. 
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